Tezos Smart Contract Audit

A Tezos smart contract audit is a security review of code deployed to Tezos, carried out against the Chain-specific execution environment execution model and written in Michelson / SmartPy / LIGO — covering both the bug classes shared across Chain-specific runtime systems and the failure modes specific to Tezos.

Tezos contracts execute with a distinctive operation model: internal operations produced by a contract are queued and executed after the current one completes, which reverses the reentrancy intuition developers bring from the EVM.

Auditing on Tezos

The deferred-operation model means an external call does not immediately hand control away — but it also means state you expect to be updated by a call has not been updated yet when your next line runs. Contracts written with EVM intuitions get this backwards in both directions.

We review the operation and entrypoint model, FA1.2/FA2 token integration, on-chain views and callback patterns, and the upgrade approach in use, plus gas and storage cost handling.

What we test that is specific to Tezos

Deferred internal operations

Operations queued rather than executed inline, and state assumptions that depend on the wrong ordering.

Callback and view patterns

Callback-based value retrieval and the trust placed in the responding contract.

FA1.2 / FA2 integration

Token standard differences, operator permissions and transfer hook behaviour.

Storage and gas limits

Storage growth costs and operations that exceed limits on adversarial input.

Upgrade patterns

Lambda-based upgrades and proxy patterns, and the authority controlling them.

Shared Chain-specific runtime attack surface

Tezos runs on Chain-specific execution environment, so it inherits the bug classes below from every system in that family.

Runtime-specific authorisation model

Whatever this chain uses instead of msg.sender — and every check that assumes EVM semantics.

State model and storage assumptions

How state is keyed, who can write it, and what an attacker can cause to be stored.

Arithmetic and serialisation

Overflow behaviour, decoding of untrusted input, and type confusion at the boundary.

Upgrade and governance authority

Who can change the code, how fast, and what the change can reach.

Bridging and external messaging

Trust placed in cross-chain messages, and replay or ordering assumptions.

Liveness and congestion behaviour

What time-sensitive logic does when blocks are full or the network stalls.

Tooling we use on this runtime

Tezos contracts are written in Michelson / SmartPy / LIGO. See our Solidity audit methodology.

How the engagement runs

  1. Scoping and threat modelling

    We fix a commit hash, agree the in-scope contracts and read your architecture docs, then build a threat model: who the actors are, what the trust boundaries are, and which invariants must never break. Nothing is reviewed against assumptions we have not written down.

  2. Manual review

    Line-by-line review by at least two auditors working independently, focused on authorisation, accounting, upgrade paths, external integrations and the gap between what the code does and what the documentation claims it does. Most critical findings come from this phase, not from tooling.

  3. Static and dynamic analysis

    Static analysers appropriate to the language, plus property-based fuzzing and invariant testing to push the system into states no unit test covers. Tooling is used to widen coverage, never to replace the manual pass.

  4. Exploit-path simulation

    Candidate findings are proven on a forked network with a working proof of concept. We report what an attacker can actually do and what it costs them, not a theoretical severity label.

  5. Reporting

    Every finding gets a severity rating, reproduction steps, the affected code, the impact in concrete terms and a specific remediation. You get a draft for discussion before anything is finalised.

  6. Fix review and re-test

    We re-test every remediation against the original proof of concept and check that the fix has not opened a new path. The final report is yours to publish.

What you receive

Tezos audit: frequently asked questions

How does Tezos change reentrancy analysis?

Internal operations are queued and run after the current execution finishes, so the classic inline reentrancy pattern does not apply — but ordering assumptions still break, frequently in the opposite direction from what EVM developers expect.

Which languages do you review?

SmartPy, LIGO and Michelson. The review works from the compiled Michelson as well as the source, since that is what actually executes.

Do you review FA2 token integrations?

Yes, including operator permissions and the differences from FA1.2 that break integrator assumptions.

What do you need from us to start an audit?

A repository or contract address, a commit hash to freeze the scope, whatever architecture or spec documentation exists, and a point of contact who can answer design questions. If documentation is thin we will write our understanding of the system back to you and ask you to confirm it — that step alone catches design-level bugs.

How long does an audit take?

A single token contract is 24–48 hours. A typical dApp or mid-sized protocol runs one to two weeks. Large DeFi systems, L2s, bridges and ZK circuits are scoped per project after we have seen the code. We will give you a fixed timeline with the quote, not an estimate that moves.

Is a re-test included after we fix the issues?

Yes. Fix review is part of the engagement, not an upsell. We re-run the original proof of concept against your patched code and confirm the fix has not introduced a new path.

Audits on related chains

Get a fixed quote in 24 hours

Send the repository and a commit hash through the contact form, message @bugtester25 on Telegram, or book a 30-minute scoping call. 200+ protocols audited · $4B+ secured · 0 hacks post-audit. Prefer email? info@safeedges.in.